Defendants sell baked goods to retailers through delivery drivers, or distributors, like plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sued Bimbo for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated. The district court authorized plaintiffs to send notices to the latter group, including distributors based outside Vermont, the state where plaintiffs reside and the District Court is located. Bimbo sought an interlocutory appeal challenging the court’s authority to do so, arguing that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the claims of out-of-state distributors, and the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.

The Supreme Court, in Brystol-Myers Squibb, held that the California court lacked personal jurisdiction over the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims. “Because the nonresident plaintiffs did not allege that they obtained Plavix, or suffered or received treatment for the injuries it caused, in the state of California, their claims did not arise out of or relate to Bristol-Myers’s contacts with California. Bristol-Myers’s relationship with third parties – the resident plaintiffs who obtained or ingested Plavix in California – was an insufficient basis for jurisdiction over the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims, even though the claims alleged similar injuries.

“Nothing in the record suggests that Bimbo’s Connecticut or New York distributors suffered FLSA violations arising from Bimbo’s contacts with Vermont. Plaintiffs argued below, but do not press on appeal, that Bimbo’s use of the same distribution protocol across the three states supplied a nexus between the in-state and out-of-state distributors. But the uniformity of the corporate practice has no more jurisdictional significance than the chemical consistency of Plavix’s ingredients. It may give rise to similar theories or claims but cannot transform out-of-state dealings into in-state contacts.”

“Rule 4(k) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure lists the bases available in federal courts on which the effective service of process establishes personal jurisdiction. Those bases include, in relevant part, a defendant’s amenability to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located, or a federal statute that specifically authorizes service of process. The FLSA contains no such authorization. Unlike some of its contemporary statutes, the original FLSA, enacted in 1938, did not provide for nationwide service of process. To this day, the FLSA requires plaintiffs to bring their case in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction.”

The Court, at the same time, was careful to distinguish the collective action from a formally certified class action under Rule 23: “There is a sufficient contrast between the unity created by a Rule 23(b)(3) class action and the loose form of an FLSA collective action. Once a putative class is certified, the class acquires a legal status separate from the interest asserted by the named plaintiff or by the absent class members as individuals. The class asserts only common questions of law or fact that predominate over individual discrepancies. A judgment resolving those questions binds all class members who have not affirmatively opted out. The unitary class claims thus might be understood to draw the spotlight of jurisdictional analysis away from any class member’s personal circumstances. A class claim, for example, remains justiciable even after the class representative’s claim becomes moot. We need not decide here whether personal jurisdiction over a class claim would be defeated by a gap in a court’s jurisdiction over an out-of-state class member’s claims; the nature of a class claim is sufficiently distinguishable from an FLSA collective action that the answer to that question does not control the outcome in this case.”

 

Provencher v. Bimbo Foods, No.24-3112, 2026 WL 1206215 (2nd Cir. May 4, 2026).