Indiana attorney Stanley Wruble III represented a client in a matter which was ultimately settled.  Thereafter, the client left a one-star review on Google, complaining that Wruble was difficult to communicate with.  Respondent then made multiple demands, using derogatory and profane language, that the client remove the review. When the client refused, Respondent posted a public response to the Google review in which he revealed damaging information about the client relating to the subject of the representation. (Respondent revealed similar damaging information in a defamation lawsuit he filed against the client in Marion County.)  By consent discipline, Respondent agreed that he violated Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 1.9(c) by impermissibly revealing information relating to the representation, as well as the Oath of Attorneys (Admission and Discipline Rule 22) by acting in an offensive manner.  While the Indiana Supreme Court approved the consent discipline, two Justices wrote separately to address the implications of enforcing the Oath.

Justice Slaughter, concurring with respect to the Rule 1.9 violation, but dissented from the parties’ agreement that Wruble should be sanctioned for violating the Oath of Attorneys. “To be clear” he wrote, “my objection is not that this charge lacks factual support; Wruble’s personality during this episode was indeed offensive. I am concerned, rather, with interpreting our oath of attorneys to impose minimal standards that warrant sanctions for those whose conduct falls short. The oath is broad and aspirational, and it lacks the specific standards found in other rules — or in the myriad primary and secondary authorities refining those rules. My specific concern is with the ever-present threat that lawyers will face charges for whatever the commission deems an “offensive personality” — an inherently subjective assessment that risks a dangerous slippery slope. The rules contemplate a wide range of permissible lawyer conduct that runs the gamut from amiable to aggressive, milquetoast to militant, passive to pugnacious. Unpopular lawyers or those with disfavored clients may be especially vulnerable to enforcement overreach. The better enforcement practice, in my view, is for the commission to avoid “offensive personality” charges altogether and to ground charges against those deserving of professional sanction (like Wruble) in one or more targeted professional-conduct rules.”

Justice Molter, joined by Justices Massa and Rush, concurred in the discipline, as the Rule 1.9 violation was independent sufficient on the facts to support the discipline. However: In a case where it makes a difference, they “remain open to considering the question Justice Slaughter’s partial dissent identifies. That is, whether an attorney can be sanctioned for violating the oath that Admission and Discipline Rule 22 requires attorneys take and subscribe to, including its promise to abstain from offensive personality. Or whether instead such a violation must be independently grounded in another rule, such as Rule of Professional Conduct 3.5(d)’s prohibition on engaging in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal, Rule 4.4(a)’s prohibition on using means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, and Rule 8.4(d)’s prohibition on conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”

 

In re Wruble, 236 N.E.2d 677 (Ind. 2024).