On April 27, 2015, the Supreme Court granted cert. to review the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Robins v. Spokeo.  In that case:  “Spokeo operates a website that provides users with information about other individuals, including contact data, marital status, age, occupation, economic health, and wealth level. Thomas Robins sued Spokeo for willful violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §1681 et seq., related to its website. Although he asserted that Spokeo’s website contained false information about him, Robins’s allegations of injury were sparse….
Robins contends that because these provisions are enforceable through a private cause of action, they create statutory rights that he has standing to vindicate in court. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (‘The actual or threatened injury required by Article III may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing’). In standing cases that analyze statutory rights, our precedent establishes two propositions. First, Congress’s creation of a private cause of action to enforce a statutory provision implies that Congress intended the enforceable provision to create a statutory right. Second, the violation of a statutory right is usually a sufficient injury in fact to confer standing.  Spokeo contends, however, that Robins cannot sue under the FCRA without showing actual harm. But the statutory cause of action does not require a showing of actual harm when a plaintiff sues for willful violations. The scope of the cause of action determines the scope of the implied statutory right. When, as here, the statutory cause of action does not require proof of actual damages, a plaintiff can suffer a violation of the statutory right without suffering actual damages.” Robins v. Spokeo, 742 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S.Ct. 1892 (2015).