Plaintiffs filed suit in Kentucky State Court against GE and a number of other defendants for various State Law claims arising from exposure to asbestos. GE removed the case under the Federal Officer Removal Statute, alleging that Mr. Horton was exposed to asbestos while serving in the Navy from 1968 to 1972. Subsequent to removal, Horton filed an amended complaint that explicitly disclaimed any claims arising from Mr. Horton’s military service, and then moved for remand, which the District Court granted.  And the U.S. Sixth Circuit affirmed.

“GE argues that Horton’s waiver came too late and that jurisdiction is frozen at the moment of removal. It is not…. The Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in Royal Canin is dispositive, holding that federal jurisdiction — or its absence — follows from the amended complaint in both original and removed cases. In a case removed on the basis of federal-question jurisdiction, when a plaintiff amends her complaint to delete all the federal-law claims, leaving nothing but state-law claims behind, then the court’s power to decide the dispute dissolves. This includes when an amendment follows a lawsuit’s removal….

“GE next argues that even based on the amended complaint, federal jurisdiction is necessary to allow GE to raise a government contractor defense to Horton’s claims arising out of GE’s provision of turbines to the USS Cascade. But Horton has raised no such claims. Even before amending her complaint, all of Horton’s claims arise from ‘exposure … within the Commonwealth of Kentucky.’ Horton then executed an affidavit disclaiming any claims arising from Mr. Horton’s military service. Finally, Horton amended the complaint to disclaim and waive ‘any cause of action or recovery for any injuries’ arising from his military service. Horton has no claims in this case, directed towards any defendant, for any federal acts.

“GE asserts that the remaining claims still ‘relate to’ Mr. Horton’s potential asbestos-exposure in the Navy for the purposes of federal-officer removal because any exposure during military service might also contribute to his total injuries. But the ordinary meaning of relating to is not so broad that it is meaningless and the federal-officer-removal statute does not reach all suits with any attenuated connection to federal duties. Instead, the ordinary understanding of ‘relating to’ requires a connection that is not ‘tenuous, remote, or peripheral.’ Rather, a defendant can remove under §1442(a)(1) by plausibly alleging a close relationship between its challenged conduct in his civilian employment and the performance of its federal duties. It is true that there may be a disputed issue of fact as to whether Horton was exposed to asbestos by GE products while working as a millwright at Appliance Park in Kentucky, or whether he was exposed to asbestos during his military service. But GE has no colorable government-contractor defense because it cannot be subjected to tort liability associated with its performance of a government procurement contract.”

 

Horton v. General Electric Company, 190 F.4th 510 (6^th Cir. 2026).